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Multi Drug-Resistant TB and Extensive Drug-Resistant TB: 






 On August 30, 2012, The 
Lancet published a troubling 
study detailing the increasing 
prevalence of drug resistant 
strains of Myobacterium tubercu-
losis (“M. tuberculosis”), which 
is the bacterium that causes tu-
berculosis (“TB”). M. tuberculo-
sis, much like other bacteria, can 
mutate in response to the drugs 
used to eradicate them; thereby, 
producing more resistant strains. 
To be classified as Multi Drug-
Resistant Tuberculosis (“MDR-
TB”) the bacterium must be re-
sistant to at least rifampicin and 
isoniazid; in contrast, Extensive 
Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis 
(“XDR-TB”), essentially a more 
resilient form of MDR-TB, re-
quires the strain to be resistant to 
the aforementioned drugs as well 
any one of the fluoroquinolone 
antibiotics and at least one se-
cond-line injectable antibiotic.1  
The study was conducted from 
January 1, 2005 to December 31, 
2008 involving subjects from Es-
tonia, Latvia, Peru, Philippines, 
Russia, South Africa, South Ko-
rea, and Thailand with the pur-
pose of examining the bacte-
rium’s resistance to second-line 
drugs.2  MDR-TB was confirmed 
in 1278 (83.0%) of the 1540 
baseline isolates collected, and 
1199 (93.8%) of those 1278 had 
a history of TB.3 Furthermore, 
there was a high frequency of 
resistance to second-line drugs in 
MDR-TB at 43.7% and the 6.7% 
risk of XDR-TB surpassed previ-
ous data provided by the World 
Health Organization (“WHO”), 
which showed a risk of only 
5.4%.4 However, the prevalence 
of XDR-TB in the study ranged 
drastically from 0.8% to 15.2% 
indicating an increasing concern, 
especially in areas with high fre-
quencies of XDR-TB.5 
Regulating Disease 
 Fortunately, the WHO has 
taken precautions to prevent the 
spread of disease by adopting the 
International Health Regulations 
(“IHR”) on May 25, 2005, which 
went into effect on June 15, 
2007.6 The purpose of the IHR is 
to “prevent, protect against, con-
trol and provide a public health 
response to the international 
spread of disease.”7 They do not 
address particular diseases in or-
der to maintain their adaptability 
and applicability in the face of 
continued disease evolution.8 The 
IHR consists of sixty six articles, 
which form the basis of the regu-
lations, as well as nine annexes 
and two appendices that supple-
ment and further explain the within 
provisions.9 Of these sixty six arti-
cles, eight are specifically applicable 
to the current issue of MDR-TB and 
XDR-TB.  
 Article 5 Surveillance and 
Article 6 Notification regard the 
Member States’ obligation to detect 
and report any events which may 
constitute a public health emergency 
as well as to “develop, strengthen 
and maintain” the capacity to do 
so.10 Article 12 Determination of a 
public health emergency of interna-
tional concern details the guidelines 
used by the General-Director of the 
WHO when determining an interna-
tional public health emergency, and 
Article 13 Public health response 
requires the Member States to 
“develop, strengthen and maintain…
the capacity to respond promptly and 
effectively” to such international 
emergencies.11  
 These articles are supple-
mented by Annex 1, which details 
the core capacity requirements for 
surveillance and response, and An-
nex 2, which assists Member States 
in determining whether an event 
may constitute an international pub-
lic health emergency that should be 
reported to the WHO.12  Article 17 
Criteria for recommendations lists 
the criteria the WHO will consider 
when issuing, modifying or termi-
nating any health recommendations, 
while Article 18 provides potential 
recommendations.13 General obliga-
tions are also set forth in Article 19 
regarding point of entry, which is 
also supplemented by Annex 1 and 
global threat to TB control due to 
inadequate treatment, rise in drug 
resistance caused by misuse of 
second-line drugs, and the lack of 
new drugs to treat MDR-TB.24 
The Strategy requires manage-
ment of MDR-TB through detec-
tion, utilizing adequate treatment 
methods, a supply of reliable 
drugs, and assessments determin-
ing the capacity of TB control 
programs to manage MDR-TB.25  
 Finally, it is essential to 
determine and address the needs 
of groups with higher risks of 
contracting and spreading the dis-
ease, such as prisoners, refugees, 
displaced peoples, migratory 
workers, the orphaned and home-
less, and those with impaired im-
mune systems.26 It is equally im-
portant to pay close attention to 
special situations such as unex-
pected population movements due 
to war, political unrest, and natu-
ral disasters.27 Even with this new 
and improved strategy that recog-
nizes the importance of detecting 
and managing MDR-TB, the 
WHO still found it necessary to 
pass a resolution further address-
ing this issue. 
 At the Sixty-second World 
Health Assembly, which took 
place on May 22, 2009, a resolu-
tion was passed specifically ad-
dressing the prevention and con-
trol of MDR-TB and XDR-TB.28 
This resolution, formally known 
as WHA62.15, not only places 
 
Continued on page 6 
DOTS expansion and enhance-
ment, (2) Address TB/HIV, MDR-
TB and other challenges, (3) Con-
tribute to health system strengthen-
ing, (4) Engage all care providers, 
(5) Empower people with TB, and 
communities, and (6) Enable and 
promote research.19  
 DOTS expansion and en-
hancement is the “cornerstone” 
and foundation of the Strategy that 
concerns political commitment 
with increased and sustained fi-
nancing, case detection through 
quality-assured bacteriology, 
standardized treatment with super-
vision and patient support, an ef-
fective drug supply and manage-
ment system, and a monitoring and 
evaluation system and impact 
measurement.20 The second com-
ponent requires implementing col-
laborative TB/HIV activities, the 
prevention and control of MDR-
TB, and addressing high-risk 
groups such as prisoners and refu-
gees.21 This component is the most 
significant, next to the DOTS ex-
pansion and enhancement, because 
it confronts the primary impedi-
ments to controlling and eliminat-
ing the disease. HIV fuels the TB 
epidemic by increasing the rate of 
recurrent TB, promoting the pro-
gression of latent and recent infec-
tions to active disease, and causing 
worse treatment outcomes and 
higher mortality.22 Therefore, the 
Strategy urges collaborative activi-
ties to address joint infection and 
reducing the burden of TB in HIV 
patients and vice versa.23 Further-
more, MDR-TB is recognized as a 
concerns both persons and car-
go.14  
 Through these articles, 
the WHO establishes the baseline 
requirements its Member States 
must follow in order to comply 
with the goals of the IHR. How-
ever, Article 43 permits Member 
States to implement their own 
health measures as long as they 
achieve an equal or greater level 
of health protection than WHO 
recommendations or are con-
sistent with the IHR.15  The Unit-
ed States is one such member 
state that has established its own 
control laws and policies regard-
ing TB.16 While the IHR are es-
sential to the control and preven-
tion of disease in general, the 
WHO has initiated programs spe-
cifically tailored to address TB. 
 The most recent manifes-
tation of the WHO’s efforts to 
curb TB is The Stop TB Strategy 
(“The Strategy”), which was im-
plemented in 2006. This new 
stratagem to combat and ulti-
mately eliminate TB relies upon 
the preexisting Directly Observed 
Treatment, Short-course 
(“DOTS”) strategy and expands 
its scope to confront additional 
challenges in TB control.17 This 
program was implemented due to 
deficient progress towards the 
goal of halving the prevalence 
and mortality of TB by 2015 re-
sulting from emerging obstacles 
– i.e. MDR-TB and HIV.18 The 
Strategy is based on six compo-
nents: (1) Pursue high-quality 
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responsibilities upon all Member 
States of the WHO, but also the 
Director-General. WHA62.15 
strongly urges the Member 
States to: (1) attain universal ac-
cess to diagnosis and treatment 
of MDR-TB and XDR-TB, (2) 
enhance quality and coverage of 
DOTS in order to reach a detec-
tion rate of 70% and successful 
treatment rate of 85% to prevent 
secondary MDR-TB, (3) use all 
financing mechanisms to fill 
funding gaps acknowledged in 
the Strategy, and (4) increase 
investment by countries and part-
ners in the research and develop-
ment of new diagnostics, medi-
cines, and vaccines to prevent 
and control TB, MDR-TB, and 
XDR-TB.29 Furthermore, it re-
quests the Director-General to: 
(1) provide assistance to Member 
States to develop and implement 
response plans for prevention 
and control of TB, MDR-TB, 
and XDR-TB, (2) provide assis-
tance to Member States to devel-
op and implement strategies to 
engage all health-care providers 
in training for and increasing 
prevention and control of TB, 
MDR-TB, XDR-TB and TB/HIV 
co-infection, (3) advise and sup-
port Member States to bring na-
tional drug regulatory standards 
up to par with international 
standards, (4) provide support to 
Member States for upgrading 
laboratory networks and facili-
tate evaluations of new and more 
efficient diagnostic technology, 
(5) help expand access to quality 
assured first and second line 
drugs, (6) explore and promote 
incentive schemes for research 
and development, (7) work with 
countries to develop indicators 
and support monitoring and eval-
uation of the implementation of 
the measures in the resolution, 
and (8) report through the Execu-
tive Board to future assemblies on 
overall progress.30 Like the IHR, 
WHA62.15 is a legislative at-
tempt to control and prevent the 
spread of disease, but addresses a 
specific disease. Additionally, it 
places a greater burden upon the 
Director-General to assist Mem-
ber States, which certainly bene-
fits poorer and less developed 
countries. The IHR, the Strategy, 
and WHA62.15 are the WHO’s 
primary weapons in confronting 
the issue of TB as a whole, in-
cluding MDR-TB and XDR-TB, 
but the ultimate question is 
whether or not these are adequate 
in the face of recent findings. 
 
Application Today 
 Dr. Sven Hoffner of the 
Swedish Institute for Communi-
cable Disease Control finds the 
prevalence of MDR-TB and XDR
-TB a great cause for concern. 
Taking the aforementioned study 
as well as other resources at his 
disposal into account, Dr. Hoffner 
finds that most recommendations 
for MDR-TB control were devel-
oped for a prevalence of 5%, but 
today’s prevalence may be as 
much as ten times higher in cer-
tain locales.31 He also alleges that 
despite all the research and stud-
ies done regarding MDR-TB there 
is still a need for “more solid epi-
demiological information” in or-
der to understand the develop-
ment and transmission of the dis-
ease.32 Dr. Hoffner is hopeful that 
the study published in The Lancet 
will contribute to the identifica-
tion of tools necessary to control 
MDR-TB, but ultimately feels 
that there is insufficient infor-
mation revealing the true distribu-
tion and magnitude of XDR-TB.33 
These contentions are further sup-
ported by facts presented by the 
WHO which found that an esti-
mated 37% of TB cases in the 
world go undetected and untreat-
ed.34 
 It is clear that the WHO’s 
actions in preventing the spread 
and control of TB have the poten-
tial to pave the road to a world 
 
IT IS CLEAR THAT THE WHO’S AC-
TIONS IN PREVENTING THE SPREAD 
AND CONTROL OF TB HAVE THE 
POTENTIAL TO PAVE THE ROAD TO 
A WORLD FREE OF TB. HOWEVER, 
BECAUSE THERE IS NOT ENOUGH 
EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY DETAIL-
ING THE DISTRIBUTION OF MDR-
TB….THE ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT 
THE WHO’S PROVISIONS IS GREAT-
LY COMPROMISED. 
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now recognize these issues and 
have the opportunity to remedy 
them through the guidance of 
the IHR and TB prevention 
measures.37 Although there is 
still much to be discovered 
about the true threat MDR-TB 
and XDR-TB pose and their 
prevalence, due to the WHO’s 
actions in addressing TB and 
disease control in general, the 
world stands a fighting chance 
in controlling and eventually 
eradicating TB, especially as 





free of TB. However, because 
there is not enough evidence suf-
ficiently detailing the distribu-
tion of MDR-TB and its preva-
lence varies greatly from place to 
place, the ability to implement 
the WHO’s provisions is greatly 
compromised. Additionally, giv-
en the turbulent times the world 
now faces, people are fleeing 
their home countries in excep-
tionally large numbers. Reloca-
tion of this sort can lead to the 
transmission of diseases because 
of the breakdown of social sup-
port and thus requires a careful 
eye, as outlined in the Strategy.35  
 One such situation is the 
migration of Africans to the Si-
cilian island of Lampedusa due 
to the current political unrest in 
many North African countries. 
Unfortunately, in May 2012, an 
inspection performed by the 
WHO in conjunction with Italian 
authorities, including the Minis-
ter of Health Renato Balduzzi, 
found the health facilities and 
services on the island inade-
quate, due to, among other 
things, lack of access to water 
and sanitation facilities, fire 
damage from a riot in August 
2011, and lack of housing facili-
ties.36 Given the want of ade-
quate care and inherently high 
risk of TB spreading in displaced 
populations, this situation is cer-
tainly precarious and may lead to 
a substantial outbreak of TB and 
disease in general. However, the 
WHO and the Italian government 





Transitional service plans are 
required by law to assist spe-
cial needs students in integrat-
ing into the community after 
graduating from high school. 
 
 High school. College. 
Law school. Career. The path to 
becoming a lawyer requires these 
essential transitions throughout 
life: from school to the real 
world. Though career planning 
can be complicated and over-
whelming for all students, a 
heightened complexity exists for 
students with disabilities. These 
students are required by law to 
transition from high school pre-
pared for whichever future path 
they choose—whether it be at-
tending post-secondary schools 
or joining the workforce. This 
responsibility for preparation 
falls largely on the shoulders of 
the student’s school district.1 The 
Individuals with Disabilities Ed-
ucation Act (IDEA)2 requires 
that such transitional services be 
mapped out within the student’s 
Individualized Education Plan 
(IEP) when the child is of high 
school age. Although Congress 
has explicitly determined that a 
plan for transition services must 
be present in a child’s IEP, 
courts interpreting the law vary 
on the legal accountability to 
which a school is held responsible 
for linking graduating special 
needs students to meaningful and 
useful post-school3 opportunities. 
These transition services must be 
more detailed and individualized 
in order to accomplish the goal of 
integration into society. 
Under the IDEA, 
“transition services” are “a coor-
dinated set of activities” designed 
to be results-oriented and focused 
on improving a child’s academic 
and functional achievement in 
order to facilitate a successful 
movement from school to post-
school activities including, but 
not limited to, post-secondary ed-
ucation, vocation education, inte-
grated employment and independ-
ent living. Sufficient and success-
ful transition services are based 
on the child’s personal needs, 
strengths, and interests and must 
provide recommendations for: 1) 
instruction, 2) related services, 3) 
community experiences, 4) devel-
opment of post-school employ-
ment and other adult living objec-
tives, and 5) when appropriate, 
the acquisition of daily life skills 
and functional vocational evalua-
tion.4 
 The IDEA’s statutory 
goals shifted in 1990 from simply 
providing educational access and 
opportunities for students with 
disabilities to actually improving 
the quality of the education ulti-
mately provided by requiring 
planned transition services.5 Tran-
sition planning is recommended 
to begin at the age of 14, or soon-
er, if the student’s IEP team, com-
prised of parents, educational fac-
ulty, school district staff, etc., feel 
that an earlier start is more appro-
priate. By age 16, the student’s 
IEP must include a detailed listing 
of the specific transition services 
needed, the agency responsible 
for providing the service(s), and 
needed or known linkages to 
community agencies with or for 
whom the student may work or 
associate with post-high school.6 
Just how far a school legally must 
go in order to connect high school 
students with disabilities to bene-
ficial future opportunities is still 
unclear. 
Applicable case law demon-
strates that the requirements 
for acceptable transition plans 
are unclear and open to inter-
pretation by the states. 
 Interpretation of a 
school’s efforts to connect stu-
dents with post-education special 
needs agencies in satisfaction of 
IDEA requirements vary across 
 
From School to the ‘Real World’: Transition Rights for Students 
with Special Needs 
jurisdictions. In some situations, 
courts have held that simply in-
forming the student and his or her 
parents of the existence of post-
high school community agencies 
was enough to satisfy the school’s 
obligation.7 However, other courts 
have held that Congress intended 
for schools to go beyond just mak-
ing students and their parents 
aware of community agencies.  
These courts articulate that Con-
gress’ intent was for schools to ac-
tually establish relationships with 
the outside organizations and even 
include the agencies in an appro-
priate student’s IEP planning pro-
cess.8 The importance of schools 
collaborating with post-education 
special needs agencies is immeas-
urable for a student’s future be-
cause these organizations will help 
to make the rest of the lives of 
these children more purposeful and 
complete. Thus, “the establishment 
of these community connections 
should be viewed as an ongoing 
process, not a one time venture.”9 
There will always be students with 
special needs filtering through the 
public school system. The most 
efficient practice would be to stay 
in touch with these agencies so that 
each new student who is entitled to 
the protection of the IDEA does 
not have to start from square one. 
A student’s assertion of his 
or her own future goals is a signifi-
cant factor in the court’s view in 
determining whether a school has 
met the transition services require-
ment under the IDEA. For exam-
ple, if a student suggests he or she 
VOLUME VI, ISSUE 1 PAGE 9 
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is interested in attending a com-
munity college, it is up to the 
school to reorganize the student’s 
IEP, via a meeting of the IEP 
team, to include what prepara-
tions the student must make in 
order to be accepted into commu-
nity college, be familiar with and 
utilize the special needs services 
that can and will be provided to 
him there and to succeed while 
there.10 
A student’s ability, or ina-
bility, to live independently after 
graduating from high school is 
another serious factor the court 
considers when determining 
whether the student had a proper 
transition services plan imple-
mented. A student who is provid-
ed with meaningful vocational 
internships and socializing activi-
ties within the school system, and 
who displays independence in the 
school setting, still may be found 
to have had an inadequate transi-
tion services plan. For example, if 
a student is not educated on the 
“basics” of independent-living 
outside of high school, such as 
normal self-hygiene and navi-
gating various transportation 
routes to get from his or her home 
to an out-of-school agency, the 
school will be deemed to have 
failed the student in this aspect of 







New York is making efforts to 
create better transition plans in 
light of 2011 research that re-
ported poor post-high school 
activity for students with spe-
cial needs. 
 In New York City, The 
ARISE Coalition (ARISE) is 
an organization comprised of 
parents, educators, and advo-
cates working to systemically 
change New York City’s pub-
lic schools for the benefit of all 
students. ARISE is concerned 
with students’ preparedness for 
life after high school. In Febru-
ary 2011, ARISE compiled a 
status brief focused on the need 
to improve the educational pro-
cess for students with disabili-
ties transitioning to adulthood. 
The brief revealed a 2009 sta-
tistic reported by the New York 
City Department of Education 
that less than seventeen percent 
of students with disabilities in 
New York State who graduate 
high school are college and/or 
career ready.12 In response to 
this statistic, ARISE conducted 
its own research by reviewing 
over two hundred fifty New 
York City student IEPs. The 
major issue with most students’ 
IEPs was the overuse of stock 
phrases within the transitions 
services portion of the form. It 
was common for IEPs that 
were reviewed to state, for ex-
ample, “Johnny will integrate 
into the community with sup-
ports as needed.”  
 Continued on Page 10 
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This statement is completely 
unbeneficial to the student in 
question since it defines nei-
ther how he will integrate, nor 
what support he requires to 
prepare to integrate.13 The 
high prevalence of unhelpful 
generic statements such as 
these illustrates how the use 
of boilerplate language in 
IEPs that merely expresses 
integration is problematic, 
and affirms that a student’s 
IEP should be personalized 
and created with an individual 
student’s strengths, needs and 
goals in mind.  
 No two students are 
exactly alike and thus, no two 
students should have identical 
transition service plans. Tran-
sition plans must be detailed 
and individualized, and such 
vague language does not cre-
ate an actionable process, in 
writing, which can be fol-
lowed by the student and the 
IEP team throughout the 
child’s time in school. With 
such limited phrases being 
inserted into IEPs, no goals 
for the student are created. 
Therefore, at the time of grad-
uation, no progress can be 
measured. Perhaps even more 
troubling, the student may be 
no better off when exiting 
school than when he or she 
had entered.  
 In order to alleviate the 
state’s shortcomings with re-
gards to its students with disabil-
ities, the New York State Educa-
tion Department (NYSED) has 
created Regional Special Educa-
tion Technical Assistance Sup-
port Centers, one of which is lo-
cated in New York City. These 
centers are staffed with profes-
sionals specializing in transition 
services, special education, bilin-
gual services, positive behavior 
interventions, etc.14 Additionally, 
the NYSED has updated the 
state’s IEP form to emphasize  
post-secondary school goals and 
the means necessary to obtain 
those goals. The NYSED has also 
created streamlined electronic 
IEPs with the incorporation of a 
new Special Education Student 
Information System (SESIS). The 
SESIS online program is de-
signed to preclude IEP teams 
from glossing over the details of 
the transition services process by 
not allowing those facilitating the 
meeting to proceed to the next 
subject area without detailing the 
student’s planned transition pro-
cedure. ARISE reported that be-
cause the program is still in its 
infancy, it may not be possible to 
measure its success for some 
time.15 However, one could as-
sume that such a program would 
nudge IEP teams to err on the 
side of including more actionable 
goals for the student than not. 
This program should lead to 
more accountability for the plan-
ners, for example preventing or 
lessening the use of stock 
phrases about general integration 
and creating for the student a 
path to a better life post-
graduation. 
 ARISE’s status brief urg-
es IEP teams to be thoughtful, 
collaborative, and understand 
that “legal requirements are not 
just red tape; they provide a 
framework for the type of plan-
ning that needs to happen for 
successful transitions from 
school to adulthood.”16 The or-
ganization notes that although 
NYSED does not require a stu-
dent’s diploma goals to be identi-
fied at all during the planning of 
transition services, it would be in 
the best interest of special needs 
students to have their diploma 
goals outlined within their IEP. 
Emphasizing diploma curriculum 
helps ensure that the high school 
provides the student with what-
ever required coursework might 
be necessary for future educa-
tional or vocational programs.17 
Finally, ARISE highlights the 
importance of successfully link-
ing students with the appropriate 
outside agencies who can and 
THOUGH CAREER PLANNING CAN 
BE COMPLICATED AND OVER-
WHELMING FOR ALL STUDENTS, A 
HEIGHTENED COMPLEXITY EXISTS 
FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES. 
THESE STUDENTS ARE REQUIRED 
BY LAW TO TRANSITION FROM 
HIGH SCHOOL PREPARED FOR 
WHICHEVER FUTURE PATH THEY 
CHOOSE—WHETHER IT BE AT-
TENDING POST-SECONDARY 
SCHOOLS OR JOINING THE WORK-
FORCE.  
VOLUME VI, ISSUE 1 PAGE 11 
will help support them in their post
-secondary endeavors.18 The or-
ganization recommends that 
schools maintain a database of 
community services geared toward 
serving and working with those 
living with disabilities. 
 
Conclusion: Students with disa-
bilities who possess detailed 
transition service plans within 
their IEPs will be more pre-
pared to handle life after school. 
 Although the IDEA’s 
standards for transition services 
for students with disabilities seem 
clear, interpretation of what is and 
isn’t enough varies by jurisdiction. 
As New York City’s ARISE Coa-
lition urges, it is in the best interest 
of special needs students for 
schools to interpret the require-
ments provided by the IDEA as 
the bare minimum. In order for 
students with disabilities to truly 
benefit from the educational op-
portunities the IDEA seeks to pro-
vide, they must have an appropri-
ate place to go after they are 
phased-out of the school system 
by either accepting their diplomas 
and/or reaching a certain age de-
termined by the district. Students 
with disabilities who contribute 
and have access to proper, detailed 
transition service processes within 
their IEPs will be more prepared to 
handle life after school. Well-
developed transition plans give 
students the ability to succeed in 
higher education, vocational edu-
cation and post-high school ca-
Continued... 
reers by providing a more useful cur-
riculum. This curriculum must be de-
signed with the student’s individual 
needs, strengths, and interests in 
mind, while they are still within the 
protection of the public school sys-
tem. 
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 Tokophobia, or the fear 
of pregnancy, is a psychological 
disorder predominately affecting 
pregnant women.1 The disorder 
involves a lack of confidence in 
the mother and/or a concern of 
harm to the fetus.2 As described 
in the following paragraphs, the 
disorder is not limited to preg-
nant women and—in selection 
of research candidates—the gov-
ernment has promulgated a set 
of regulations that reflects its 
own form of tokophobia.3 In or-
der to increase equality, autono-
my and safety for pregnant 
women, the government should 
shed its tokophobia and rewrite 
regulations to allow greater ac-
cess to research for pregnant 
women. 
 Research is defined as “a 
systematic investigation de-
signed to develop or contribute 
to generalizable knowledge.”4 
The justification for allowing 
research on human subjects, par-
ticularly those who are at risk of 
harm, is the corollary benefit in 
the form of “generalizable 
knowledge” obtained from re-
search results.5 For example, 
clinical trials for drug approval 
may involve a risk of toxicity to 
healthy individuals; however, 
the studies are used to enhance 
safety profiles of the drug.6 The 
information gathered from re-
search provides guidance to a 
prescribing physician to deter-
mine the right dosage and patient 
to receive the drug.7 If no such 
study is performed and the drug 
is approved with latent toxicities 
to an untested group of individu-
als, future patients in that group 
are at a much greater risk of 
harm.8   
 Under the current regula-
tions, “generalizable knowledge” 
is not an acceptable ground for 
conducting research on pregnant 
subjects.9 Instead, research in-
volving pregnant subjects at risk 
of harm is only permissible if 
there is a direct benefit to the 
mother or fetus.10 Accordingly, 
participation in clinical trials in-
volving pharmaceuticals or thera-
peutic devices is severely limited 
for pregnant women because clin-
ical trials generally involve risk 
of harm without direct benefit to 
the specific research subject.11 
The Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), which regulates clini-
cal trials in the U.S., even goes so 
far as to state that non-pregnant 
women of child-bearing age 
“must be counseled about the re-
liable use of contraception or ab-
stinence from intercourse while 
participating in the clinical tri-
al.”12 
 Nevertheless, the same 
drug that is too risky to test dur-
ing research—where subjects are 
carefully selected, monitored, 
required to give informed con-
sent and provided information on 
the risks of the intervention—
will subsequently become availa-
ble by prescription without suffi-
cient knowledge or warning as to 
its teratogenicity (toxicity to the 
fetus).13 Accordingly, instead of 
reducing the risk of harm to 
pregnant women, the current reg-
ulatory regime just delays risk 
until the drug is actually ap-
proved, when more people are 
vulnerable and fewer are paying 
attention.14  
 The Belmont Report, 
which articulates the basic ethi-
cal principles for human subjects 
in research, provides that injus-
tice occurs when some benefit to 
which a person is entitled is de-
nied without good reason or 
when some burden is imposed 
unduly.15 The Department of Hu-
man Health and Services (HHS), 
the government agency in the 
United States that regulates hu-
man research, has, in contraven-
tion of the Belmont Report, 
promulgated guidelines that un-
justly deny pregnant women ac-
cess to the benefits of research.16  
VOLUME VI, ISSUE 1 PAGE 13 
 HHS states that in the se-
lection of research subjects, review 
boards “should be particularly 
cognizant of the special problems 
of research involving vulnerable 
populations, such as children, pris-
oners, pregnant women, mentally 
disabled persons, or economically 
or educationally disadvantaged 
persons.”17  Aside from pregnant 
women, each of the groups cited in 
the list of “vulnerable populations” 
have diminished autonomy as a 
result of physical confinement, 
age, mental capacity, or despera-
tion.18 Pregnant women do not 
have diminished autonomy nor do 
they lack decision-making capaci-
ty.19  Thus, they do not logically 
belong to a “vulnerable popula-
tion.” Such a designation is arbi-
trary, paternalistic and demeaning. 
 In reality, HHS and the un-
derlying regulations are less con-
cerned with pregnant women and 
more with the vulnerability of fe-
tuses; specifically, that pregnant 
women cannot be trusted to make 
decisions for their fetus. A woman 
has the right to an abortion,20 
which clearly puts the fetus at ex-
treme risk of harm, yet she is de-
nied a choice to enter into research 
over concerns of harm to that same 
fetus.21 By simply comparing 
“risks” to the fetus, research is 
clearly on much stronger footing 
than abortion.  
Pregnant women are per-
mitted to engage in a number of 
other activities that are proven to 
be very dangerous to the develop-
Continued... 
ment of the fetus and, unlike the 
investigatory nature of research, 
hold out very little corresponding 
benefit to the fetus (and arguably 
even the mother). Some of those 
activities include: smoking, drink-
ing alcohol, eating sushi and even 
participating in the Olympics.22 
By permitting these activities, we 
as society trust the woman to 
make the best 
decision for her-
self and the fe-
tus. Thus, it is 
unclear why in 
the case of re-
search, women are denied individ-
ual autonomy and the ability to 
make their own fully informed 
decisions.  The only logical basis 
is that research provides no corol-
lary benefit worth protecting.  
 Research holds tremen-
dous benefit in the form of 
knowledge and the potential re-
duction of risk to generations of 
future mothers. Without extensive 
research, patients would be naïve 
to the potential harm a particular 
drug may cause.  An alarming ex-
ample of the risk of naivety is the 
drug Thalidomide, which was ap-
proved for prescription to a select 
group of people needing a seda-
tive or tranquilizer.23 Thalidomide 
was never licensed for general 
use, nor was it approved for ad-
ministration to pregnant women.24 
Nonetheless, physicians touted 
Thalidomide as a “wonder drug” 
and prescribed it off label to preg-
nant mothers for alleviation of 
morning sickness.25 The drug was 
ultimately found to be a severe 
teratogen and became responsi-
ble for as many as 20,000 horrif-
ic birth defects.26 Had the terato-
genic effects of Thalidomide 
been thoroughly evaluated prior 
to approval, it likely would have 
had many fewer victims. 
While facially protective, 
current provisions limiting ac-
cess to research actually increase 
the risk of harm to the fetus. 
Denying pregnant women the 
right to choose to enter research 
is inequitable, paternalistic and 
irresponsible. The ultimate deci-
sion as to whether the benefit 
outweighs the risk should at least 
partially lie with the mother and 
not entirely with the government. 
According to the court in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
“[t]he ability of women to partic-
ipate equally in the economic 
and social life of the Nation has 
been facilitated by their ability to 
control their reproductive 
lives.”27  HHS and the legislature 
should consider rewriting regula-
tions to remove pregnant women 
from the list of “vulnerable pop-
ulations” and include 
“generalizable knowledge” as a 
justification for research to erad-
icate this inequality. In doing so, 
the government can resolve its 
tokophobia and put research in 
line with existing federal law and 
community standards, which al-
ready recognize that women 
should be able to decide what is 
in their own best interest and that 
of the fetus. 
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Criminalizing drug use 
during pregnancy is an attack on 
women’s bodily autonomy 
framed as a protection of unborn 
children.  This framework reduc-
es women to, “being little more 
than incubators to unborn chil-
dren.”1  This dehumanizing 
stance has a negative effect on 
the status of women in society 
and violates women’s constitu-
tional rights.  Additionally, stat-
utes and prosecutions targeted 
toward prenatal substance abuse 
do not accomplish the intended 
goal of promoting fetal health.  
As a result of this punitive legal 
system, women, unborn chil-
dren, and their families suffer.  
This article will argue that a 
public health framework, in con-
trast to a punitive legal system, 
is a better and more functional 
approach for addressing prob-
lems associated with prenatal 
substance abuse. 
 A punitive legal ap-
proach endangers a woman’s 
bodily autonomy.  Bodily auton-
omy is the power of a woman to 
make choices about her own 
body, and specifically in the 
context of prenatal substance 
abuse, about her pregnancy and 
treatment.2  When the legal sys-
tem takes a punitive approach 
towards women using drugs dur-
ing pregnancy, it subordinates 
women and takes away their bod-
ily autonomy.3  This is not to say 
that a woman’s bodily autonomy 
is the only concern regarding pre-
natal drug use.  Roe v. Wade es-
tablished the states’ interest in 
protecting the potential life of a 
fetus; however, neither the wom-
an’s right to privacy during preg-
nancy nor the states’ interest in 
potential life is absolute.4    
 Policies criminalizing 
drug use during pregnancy pit 
fetal rights against women’s 
rights and ultimately conclude 
that fetal rights trump the rights 
of women.5  Women using drugs 
during pregnancy have been 
charged with crimes ranging from 
assault with a deadly weapon to 
child endangerment and often 
receive stricter sentences than 
drug users who are not pregnant.6  
This leads to the conclusion that 
pregnancy is a dominant factor in 
prosecutions, and it becomes 
clear that this punitive approach 
serves as another way for the 
state to reduce a woman’s bodily 
autonomy.7  As discussed below, 
the punitive framework for drug-
addicted pregnant women may 
actually hurt the fetus it is sup-
posed to protect because it can 
result in fewer women seeking 
pre-natal care or drug treatment 
as well as children being separat-
ed from their mothers.8  In con-
trast, a public health approach 
aims to balance the interests of 
women’s autonomy and the 
states’ interest in potential life 
resulting in policies that are more 
functional and just for women 
and their families.9   
 
What does the Constitution say 
about bodily autonomy and 
targeting certain groups of 
pregnant women for prosecu-
tion?   
 The Supreme Court es-
tablished in a line of case law, 
and affirmed in Roe v. Wade, that 
the Constitution provides a gen-
eral right to privacy.10  Further, 
Roe v. Wade established the right 
to privacy in the context of ter-
minating pregnancy; so it follows 
that this fundamental right to pri-
vacy must also apply to a wom-
an’s choices during pregnancy.11  
Within that right to privacy is the 
fundamental right to procreate, 
first addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
invalidating the state’s forced 
sterilization of certain “habitual” 
criminals.12  The right to procre-
ate was expanded upon in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut.13  As one 
scholar noted that while Gris-
wold, “ … specifically discussed 
only protecting the marital rela-
tionship, its holding in fact cre-
ates a right to privacy concerning 
intimate matters such as deci-
sions about procreation.”14 
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 When statutes criminaliz-
ing drug use during pregnancy in-
fringe upon the privacy and pro-
creation rights of women, they cre-
ate a basis for an Equal Protection 
claim.15 The Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was first applied to give 
equal protection of the law to ra-
cial minorities but has since been 
extended to apply to members of 
suspect classes, including wom-
en.16  In order to analyze an Equal 
Protection claim for state laws 
dealing with prenatal drug use, the 
level of appropriate scrutiny to be 
applied to the law needs to be de-
termined.  The Supreme Court has 
most recently applied a heightened 
form of intermediate scrutiny to 
gender based discrimination mean-
ing a state must demonstrate an 
“exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion”17 of a government purpose 
for a law facially discriminating on 
the basis of gender.18  Laws target-
ing pregnant women are facially 
discriminatory because they only 
apply to females; so, the govern-
ment would have to provide an 
exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion for an important government 
interest.19   One potential counter 
argument for the government to 
respond with would be that it is 
difficult and impractical to prose-
cute men for fetal harm caused by 
drug use; however, that is not suf-
ficient to justify an important gov-
ernment interest.20  
 Prosecutions targeting 
pregnant drug users are usually 
Continued... 
based in a child abuse or endan-
germent statute and not an actual 
drug abuse charge, and “pregnant 
women receive harsher sentences 
than drug-addicted men or women 
who are not pregnant.”21  While 
statutes addressing prenatal sub-
stance abuse target women, there 
are no statutes or cases targeting 
fathers of unborn children who 
have used drugs that potentially 
harm their sperm.22  Consequent-
ly, even though the right to priva-
cy applies equally to men and 
women, it is being applied differ-
ently in the context of drug use 
and procreation simply because 
women naturally carry the fetus 
that took a man and a woman to 
create.23 Thus, women are treated 
more harshly when they are preg-
nant while men are not similarly 
impacted when they use drugs and 
procreate giving rise to an Equal 
Protection Clause claim on the 
basis of gender discrimination.24   
 Additionally, an Equal 
Protection claim could be estab-
lished where it is demonstrated 
that state law disproportionately 
impacts African American women 
and there was some discriminato-
ry purpose behind the state law.25  
All too often, the common factor 
in prosecutions against pregnant 
women for drug use and hospital 
drug testing on pregnant women 
is that the women chosen for test-
ing are African American.26  This 
is true despite that fact that evi-
dence shows drug use by pregnant 
women is similar across racial 
lines, but, “black women are 
more than ten times more likely 
than white women to be reported 
for using drugs while pregnant.”27  
This disparate impact strongly 
implies that African American 
women are being specifically tar-
geted; therefore, it suggests at 
least some evidence of a discrimi-
natory purpose behind these laws.  
 Prenatal substance abuse 
laws can also be attacked as a 
Constitutional violation of the 
Due Process Clause.  An im-
portant tenet of the Due Process 
Clause is fair notice of the scope 
of what is forbidden by the lan-
guage of the laws.28  This not on-
ly protects the accused from the 
court creating illegality retroac-
tively, but also emphasizes the 
importance of the legislative in-
tent.29  When women are charged 
under various child abuse and en-
dangerment statutes, they are not 
given fair notice because almost 
none of the statutes used to 
charge women using drugs during 
pregnancy include harm against a 
fetus; thus, such charges tend to 
equate a fetus with a minor 
child.30  For example, in State of 
New Mexico v. Martinez, the de-
fendant was charged under a felo-
ny child abuse statute after admit-
ting to using cocaine during her 
pregnancy.31  Because the child 
abuse statute in question did not 
include a fetus in the statutory 
meaning of “human being,” the  
      Continued on page 16 
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court concluded that convicting 
the defendant under the statute, 
“would violate Martinez’s con-
stitutional due process rights, as 
she did not have prior warning 
and fair notice that her conduct 
was criminal under the stat-
ute.”32  
 While the state has an 
established interest in the poten-
tial life of a fetus, a fetus is not 
legally equivalent to a child and 
therefore is not afforded the 
same rights and protections.33  
When women are prosecuted 
under various child abuse and 
endangerment statutes as a result 
of using drugs while pregnant, 
the state is effectively giving 
personhood status to the wom-
an’s fetus, setting a dangerous 
precedent for policing women’s 
every action and choice during 
pregnancy such as the kinds of 
food she eats while pregnant, 
and her particular birth plan.34  
This disturbing possibility is al-
ready starting to become a reali-
ty in South Carolina following 
Whitner v. State of South Caroli-
na35 which upheld Whitner’s 
child abuse conviction received 
for using crack cocaine during 
her pregnancy, despite the fact 
that her child was born 
healthy.36  This is especially 
alarming considering that in at 
least one major South Carolina 
hospital, African American 
pregnant women are much more 
likely to be tested for drug use 
than Caucasian pregnant wom-
en.37  This opens the door for 
state-sanctioned racial profiling 
and gender discrimination. 
 
How a public health approach 
promotes fetal and maternal 
health while protecting wom-
en’s Constitutional rights. 
 It is clear that the punitive 
approach to prenatal substance 
abuse is constitutionally problem-
atic for women; however, there 
are still concerns about how to 
best address the problems result-
ing from drug use during preg-
nancy.  It is acknowledged that 
drug use during pregnancy can 
have detrimental effects on the 
unborn child. Nevertheless, how 
these women are dealt with after-
wards is still of vital concern and 
importance.  A public health ap-
proach rather than a punitive ap-
proach is more functional for 
women and their unborn children.  
A public health approach can be 
defined as one, “that identifies 
the population-based factors that 
may influence health, rather than 
focusing on an individual’s per-
sonal behavior.”38  A useful 
framework for comparing the two 
approaches is thinking about the 
rationales for a punitive approach 
and the responses provided by 
supporters of a public health ap-
proach.39 
 The first rationale given 
under the current punitive system 
is that prosecution of prenatal 
substance abuse will deter preg-
nant women from using drugs 
because of the consequences of 
prosecution.40  However, it ap-
pears that levels of prenatal sub-
stance abuse are not decreasing 
and may be in fact increasing.41  
Moreover, it is also shown that 
prosecutions actually have the 
opposite effect, causing women 
to forego prenatal care altogether, 
resulting in an even riskier situa-
tion for women and their unborn 
children.42  This is further sup-
ported by many organizations 
including the American Academy 
of Pediatrics and the March of 
Dimes who agree that a punitive 
approach has the effect of deter-
ring women from seeking medi-
cal treatment during pregnancy, 
depriving themselves and their 
unborn children of vital prenatal 
care.43 
 The next rationale for a 
punitive system is based on retri-
bution and the idea that pregnant 
drug users deserve legal punish-
ment because their actions are 
wrong regardless of how the pun-
ishment affects their lives or the 
lives of their unborn children.44  
However, this rationale ignores 
the disease aspect of drug addic-
tion as well as the social and eco-
nomic disparities that often corre-
late with illegal drug use.45  Fur-
thermore, the retribution rationale 
should be analyzed with suspi-
cion because it invokes Equal 
Protection and Due Process con-
cerns.46  Additionally, the idea of 
retribution makes less policy 
sense considering the limited 
number of drug treatment options 
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for pregnant women, and evidence 
that many drug treatment centers 
turn away pregnant women in a 
time when they need treatment the 
most.47 
 The final rationale used to 
justify the punitive system to drug 
use during pregnancy is that it pro-
motes fetal and maternal health by 
facilitating medical intervention.48  
Unfortunately, the opposite ap-
pears to be true. When women are 
incarcerated during pregnancy be-
cause of drug use, they are some-
times forced to give birth shackled 
or in unsanitary prison facilities, 
resulting in dehumanizing and po-
tentially dangerous situations.49   
 
Public Health Approach as an 
Alternative 
 A public health approach 
can provide functional solutions to 
the challenges faced by pregnant 
drug users while avoiding the con-
stitutional and policy concerns 
raised by the punitive approach.  
Some of the best public health so-
lutions focus on the importance of 
prevention and treatment, specifi-
cally educating women about the 
dangers of drug use during preg-
nancy and providing feasible treat-
ment options to pregnant women 
struggling with addiction.50  In or-
der to encourage pregnant drug 
users to seek vital prenatal care 
and addiction treatment, programs 
that can provide healthcare with-
out fear of punishment need to be 
Continued... 
established and funded.51 
A major barrier for many 
women seeking drug treatment is 
the lack of healthcare coverage 
and an inability to pay for a treat-
ment program.52  It follows that 
access to universal healthcare 
coverage including drug treatment 
programs and prenatal care would 
alleviate this barrier for many 
women.53  One specific example 
of a public health approach in-
cludes California’s policy of ad-
dressing drug use during pregnan-
cy that places the issue in the 
realm of child protective services 
rather than criminal law.54  Com-
bining access to affordable treat-
ment and handling by child pro-
tective agencies  is effective be-
cause it removes the threat of 
criminal prosecution while giving 
a greater opportunity for maternal 
and fetal health.55    
It is also important for 
treatment approaches to take into 
account the fact that many women 
who need treatment also have oth-
er children for whom they are re-
sponsible. Consequently, treat-
ment programs should be wel-
coming to families and cognizant 
of the importance of keeping them 
together.56 This promotes the ulti-
mate goal of a healthy woman 
giving birth to a healthy child.  
 
Conclusion 
Accepting the status quo 
punitive approach to avoid diffi-
cult reform devalues the high 
stakes of promoting healthy 
women and children.  Protecting 
an unborn child from the nega-
tive effects of drugs use does not 
have to compromise the moth-
er’s bodily autonomy and Con-
stitutional rights.  Fetal and ma-
ternal rights should be protected 
together in the interest of a 
healthy family.  The best way to 
do this is to establish a public 
health system that focuses on 
preventing and treating prenatal 
substance abuse. 
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A biospecimen is a sam-
ple taken from the human body 
that can come in many forms, 
including tissue, blood, and 
urine, and contains a vast 
amount of cellular material.1  
Biobanks are the reposito-
ries  that house these specimens 
for safe keeping.2  They usually 
involve cryogenic capabilities 
for preservation and are main-
tained by the organization con-
ducting the research.3  In 2009, 
Time Magazine named Bi-
obanks as one of the “10 Ideas 
Changing the World Right 
Now”.4  Needless to say, bio-
specimen research has been on 
the rise, and an investigation in-
to whether the regulatory world 
has been able to keep up with 
this progress is essential.   
 
The National Cancer In-
stitute (NCI) is at the forefront 
of the biobanking movement due 
to the potential information that 
can be harvested from speci-
mens that is also relevant to the 
field of oncology.5  It is one of 
the keys to the movement to-
wards personalized medicine .  
Biospecimen analysis can and 
has led to better diagnostic, 
prognostic, and staging tech-
niques and outcomes in cancer 
medicine by allowing for the 
evaluation of disease suscepti-
bility.6  Time magazine  raised 
concerns surrounding the collec-
tion and storage of biospecimens, 
including maintaining the privacy 
of the individuals whose genetic 
material is stored for future use 
and the appropriate informed 
consent procedures for obtaining 
these specimens.  These issues 
are especially pertinent with re-
gards to modern cancer research.  
 
 
The Intersection of HIPAA and 
Biospecimen Research 
 
 The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) governs not only an 
individual’s right to privacy of 
their individually identifiable 
health information, but also their 
right to access their protected 
health information (PHI ).7  PHI 
is defined as:  
“any information, 
whether oral or recorded in 
any form or medium” that 
“is created or received by a 
health care provider, health 
plan, public health authori-
ty, employer, life insurer, 
school or university, or 
health care clearinghouse” 
and “related to the past, 
present, or future physical 
or mental health or condi-
tion of an individual; the 
provision of health care to 
an individual; or the past, 
present, or future payment 
for the provision of health 
care to an individual.”8 
Biobanking poses interesting 
challenges to compliance under 
HIPAA.  One is whether a pa-
tient can ensure the confidentiali-
ty of their PHI when a chunk of 
tissue can include vast amounts 
of an individual’s genetic infor-
mation and HIPAA is not clear 
as to whether this type of infor-
mation is covered. An individu-
al’s entitlement to know what 
information is collected from 
their biospecimen is further de-
batable. 
 
 Biospecimens are not di-
rectly covered by the HIPAA 
privacy rule. However, these 
specimens are often accompa-
nied by identifiable PHI and may 
therefore be indirectly covered.9  
The Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) estab-
lished The Secretary’s Commit-
tee on Human Research Protec-
tions (SACHRP) in 2001 to ad-
vise the Secretary of HHS on is-
sues surrounding the protection 
of human research subjects.10  
These recommendations can then 
Everyone Wants a Piece of Me: The Evolution of Biospecimen Re-
search and the Regulatory World’s Attempt to Keep Up 
BIOSPECIMEN RESEARCH IS 
EVOLVING AT A PACE FAR FAST-
ER THAN THE REGULATIONS 
THAT GOVERN IT.  IT IS QUITE 
CLEAR THAT CLARIFICATION IS 
NEEDED, ESPECIALLY CONSIDER-
ING THAT MUCH OF WHAT AP-
PEARS ESSENTIAL TO PATIENT 
PROTECTION IS SIMPLY A REC-
OMMENDATION AT THIS POINT.  
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be used by local practitioners us-
ing informed consent and research 
practices related to biospecimens.  
Their most recent release in July 
of 2011 was specifically targeted 
to researchers and institutional re-
view boards (IRBs) involved in 
biospecimen research and provides 
some clarification on the privacy 
concerns by addressing any rele-
vant HIPAA issues that arise un-
der several commonly encountered 
clinical scenarios.11   The guidance 
issued by SACHRP is not promul-
gated regulations, and it is unclear 
exactly how many institutions are 
aware of and follow their recom-
mendations.  One such recommen-
dation includes the use of an hon-
est-broker, which involves placing 
a barrier between clinical and re-
search activities by removing any 
HIPAA-designated PHI and pre-
venting reidentification.12  An hon-
est-broker can take the form of a 
person or system that replaces PHI 
with a code and then releases only 
the coded information to the re-
search team.13  The recommenda-
tion states that this honest-broker 
procedure may be used “if appro-
priate” but does not define what an 
appropriate circumstance would 
be.14  Nevertheless, it would seem 
that this would be the best way to 
protect a patient’s identity 
throughout the biospecimen col-
lection process because it includes 
measures to prevent reidentifica-
tion  by anything or anyone other 
than the honest-broker.15  Another 
benefit of this system comes from 
the fact that an honest-broker is 
Continued... 
the only link between research 
identifiers and clinical identifiers 
and therefore reduces the oppor-
tunity for conflicts of interest to 
arise between the research and 
clinical teams.16 
 
 Another recommendation 
involves the use of Certificates of 
Confidentiality.  These certifi-
cates are issued by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) to pro-
tect PHI and other information 
collected during a research study 
from being forcibly disclosed by 
investigators during any sort of 
legal proceeding.17  Again, the 
recommendations fail to explicitly 
state where such a certificate is 
appropriate and simply state that 
they “may not be appropriate for 
all biospecimen resources.”18  
These certificates are promising 
in that they have the potential to 
encourage individuals to partici-
pate in biospecimen research. As 
such, they could become a man-
datory part of biobanking so that 
participants are assured of confi-
dentiality.   
 
 Additionally, if the hospi-
tal or institution performing the 
biospecimen collection is a 
HIPAA covered entity, the disclo-
sure of any PHI would require a 
HIPAA authorization from the 
patient.19  Any subsequent disclo-
sures of material containing PHI 
to various entities would require a 
new HIPAA authorization by the 
patient if that entity was not cov-
ered in the original authoriza-
tion.20  This establishes a track-
ing mechanism of interested par-
ties that desire access to a partic-
ular individual’s biospecimen 
and places the research partici-
pant in control of who has access 
to their information.  A conflict 
arises when attempting to com-
ply with both the HIPAA Priva-
cy Rule that governs research 
authorizations and the Federal 
Common Rule for Protection of 
Human Research Subjects, 
which governs the informed con-
sent process.  According to the 
Privacy Rule, a research authori-
zation must “pertain only to a 
specific research study, not to 
nonspecific research or to future, 
unspecified projects.”21  The Pri-
vacy Rule considers the creation 
and maintenance of a bioreposi-
tory as a “specific research activ-
ity [and] the subsequent use or 
disclosure by a covered entity of 
information from the database 
for a specific research study will 
require separate authorization.”22   
On the other hand, the Common 
Rule allows for future research 
to be consented to as long as the 
informed consent document suf-
ficiently details the future re-
search.23  Although it would ap-
pear from a legal perspective that 
the appropriate approach in deal-
ing with seemingly conflicting 
rules is to observe and comply 
with the stricter one, it is unclear 
how a research team on a local 
level decides to comply with two  
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rules that govern their biospeci-
men research.  An informed con-
sent document usually goes hand
-in-hand with its corresponding 
research authorization, which 
may cause further confusion for 
the local practitioner. 
 
 HIPAA regulations and 
NCI recommendations encour-
age the stripping of PHI from  
biospecimens and the prevention 
of reidentification, so how then 
might federal regulations com-
ply with a patient’s right to ac-
cess any health related infor-
mation derived from these speci-
mens?  Unfortunately it is not 
clear whether information de-
rived from biospecimens would 
be covered under HIPAA, but it 
would appear that genetic results 
would qualify as information 
that is “related to the past, pre-
sent, or future physical or mental 
health or condition of an indi-
vidual…”24  Most human sub-
jects research in the United 
States is governed by the Com-
mon Rule.25  The Common Rule 
necessitates several basic re-
quirements related to the in-
formed consent process, such as 
that the consent form must in-
clude any additional costs that a 
research participant may incur 
from participation in the re-
search and any reasonably fore-
seeable risks to the research par-
ticipant.26   None of the rule’s 
requirements includes an obliga-
tion to return any data, including 
genetic information, to a study 
participant.27  These same in-
formed consent regulations in-
clude that the following should be 
provided to a research partici-
pant: “A statement that signifi-
cant new findings developed dur-
ing the course of the research 
which may relate to the subject’s 
willingness to continue participa-
tion will be provided to the sub-
ject.”28  Because results from ge-
netic analyses could affect a par-
ticipant’s willingness to continue 
in a research study, the signifi-
cance of the generated infor-
mation should undergo careful 
consideration when drafting an 
informed consent.29   
 
 Stepping away from the 
regulatory aspects and consider-
ing the ethical aspects of an indi-
vidual’s right to information un-
fortunately and surprisingly  does 
not provide clarification.  The 
National Bioethics Advisory 
Board (NBAC) closely examined 
the ethical issues surrounding 
research with biological materi-
als, but made no reference to a 
participant’s absolute right to 
access data from their participa-
tion in a research study.30  The 
NBAC did recommend that the 
disclosure of research results be 
an exceptional event that occurs 
only when the results could have 
an impact on the subject’s health 
and ameliorative measures are 
available to cope with the clini-
cal implications of these re-
sults.31  This guidance is  based 
on what the clinician and re-
searcher deems an appropriate 
circumstance for disclosure, ra-
ther than addressing what the 
patient may deem a disclosure 
event.  Additionally, the NBAC 
ceased to exist in 2001 and no 
similar government groups or 
committees have been estab-
lished to address the bioethics of 
biobanking.32 
A Truly Informed Consent  
 
 In 2008, the Arizona 
Court of Appeals reversed a 
summary judgment dismissal of 
a claim by the Havasupai Native 
Americans against Arizona State 
University for unconsented mis-
use of their blood specimens.33  
The Havasupai had initially con-
sented to research involving dia-
betes, a disease that was plaguing 
the tribe, but later learned that 
data derived from their blood 
samples had been used in various 
publications unrelated to their 
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initial purpose, such as schizo-
phrenia, inbreeding, and popula-
tion migration.34  Particularly up-
setting was the report on popula-
tion migration that directly contra-
dicted the tribe’s own belief of 
their origin.35  A large settlement 
in favor of the Havasupai was 
reached.  In a New York Times 
article on the case, Dr. David 
Karp, a University of Texas South-
western Medical Center internist 
who studies informed consent for 
genetic research, asked, “The 
question is, how far do you have to 
go?  Do you have to create some 
massive database of people’s 
wishes for their DNA speci-
mens?”36   One might think so and 
current regulations contemplate 
the progress towards a truly in-
formed process of consent in the 
field of biospecimen research. 
 
 A patient’s tissue has the 
potential to outlast the patient.  
Techniques for biospecimen 
preservation have improved as the 
prevalence of biobanking has in-
creased.  Thus, future and second-
ary uses of biospecimens have in-
creased as well.  The NCI Best 
Practices guidance document on 
informed consent recommends 
that a tiered structure of informed 
consent be instituted when bio-
specimens are involved so that pa-
tients can consent to only particu-
lar uses and not others .37  For ex-
ample, if this tiered consent struc-
ture had been used in the case of 
the Havasupai tribe, the partici-
pants would have been presented 
Continued... 
with a consent form that would 
have included the potential uses 
for their tissue.  They would have 
perhaps consented to the use of 
their biospecimens in diabetes 
research but not to any sort of re-
search involving evolutionary or 
migratory patterns.  This concept 
of future consent is complicated 
by conflicting federal guidelines.  
The Common Rule allows for fu-
ture unspecified research, while 
HIPAA, as mentioned earlier, re-
quires that every entity have au-
thorization to conduct research.38  
It is not yet clear how these differ-
ences are being reconciled in the 
clinical and research settings. 
 
 The NCI has taken on the 
task of attempting to provide clar-
ification to local IRBs and bio-
specimen researchers.  In 2011, 
the NCI’s Group Banking Com-
mittee drafted an Informed Con-
sent Template which gives a pa-
tient the power to decide whether 
their biospecimens may be stored 
and used for future research.39  
Notably, the informed consent 
was also written in very simple 
language, with a preferred eighth 
grade reading level, which ad-
dresses any concerns that a patient 
may not fully understand what 




 Increasingly common 
within the field of oncology is the 
practice of collecting a biospeci-
men upon entry to a clinical trial.  
The ethics of this mandatory bio-
specimen collection, that is when 
eligibility for a trial is dependent 
upon undergoing a biopsy, is 
currently being investigated.  
Clinical biopsies are common in 
oncology and are needed for di-
agnostic purposes.  In contrast, 
research biopsies are biopsies 
performed for research purposes 
only and have no established di-
rect benefit to the patient.41  
Within the research biopsies 
group, there are two common 
categories: 1) research biopsies 
used for correlative studies that 
are often exploratory and rarely 
predefined; and 2) research biop-
sies used for studying an integral 
biomarker and the results will be 
used to guide patient care 
throughout the study and often-
times to determine eligibility for 
study entry.42  There are always  
safety risks with invasive proce-
dures, but at least there is direct 
benefit to the patient that balanc-
es out this risk when clinical bi-
opsies are used for diagnostic 
purposes.  The concern over re-
search biopsies is that you are 
exposing a patient to a safety 
risk when there is no established 
direct benefit to the patient.43  
Given the lack of direct benefit, 
a patient should be given a very 
explicit option to consent to a 
research biopsy.  But what if this 
biopsy is an entry criterion for a 
clinical trial?  Some researchers  
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have suggested that conditioning 
study participation in this way 
may be a form of coercion.44  
Clinical trials are often entered 
into because they are the last 
resort for a patient.  The level of 
choice  for someone during a 
Phase I clinical trial, for exam-
ple, is often severely limited.  If 
a patient does not want to under-
go this biopsy, they should not 
be barred from perhaps the last 
therapy option available to them.   
A survey of cancer patients 
showed that approximately one 
third of clinical trial participants 
would be hesitant to participate 
in a study involving mandatory 
research biopsies but a larger 
percentage (50%) said it would 
have no impact.45  Very little has 
been written on this topic and it 
is still unclear how local IRBs 
are reviewing studies that in-
clude mandatory research biop-
sies.  A higher level of scrutiny 
is appropriate for such studies, 
especially regarding the safety 
concerns.  For example, a skin 
biopsy may not necessarily in-
crease the safety concerns but a 
much more invasive liver biopsy 
should affect the safety profile 
of a study and therefore may not 
be as readily approved by an 
IRB. 
 Biospecimen research is 
evolving at a pace far faster than 
the regulations that govern it.  It 
is quite clear that clarification is 
needed, especially considering 
that much of what appears es-
sential to patient protection is 
simply a recommendation at this 
point.  Moreover, the regulations 
that do exist often conflict with 
one another, as evidenced by the 
disconnect between the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule and the Common 
Rule governing clinical trials re-
search.  The case involving the 
Havasupai tribe is promising in 
that it demonstrates the attention 
the courts are willing to focus on 
potential abuses of biorepository 
banking and damaging resulting 
consequences of research with 
insufficient regulation and over-








 On February 14, 2012, the 
United States Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) announced 
that 19 US medical practices had 
purchased counterfeit Avastin, a 
commonly used cancer drug, from 
a foreign supplier named Quality 
Specialty Products.1 Also this 
year, two separate instances have 
been reported concerning the pur-
chase of counterfeit Vicodin, a 
pain relief medication, via the In-
ternet. Abbott Laboratories subse-
quently issued a consumer alert to 
help prevent the sale of the coun-
terfeit drug through rogue web-
sites.2 In a third instance, in Sep-
tember, China State Food and 
Drug Administration and the US 
FDA initiated a joint campaign, 
which resulted in the shutdown of 
18 Chinese-language web sites in 
America selling counterfeit drugs, 
in violation of US laws.3  
These incidents are only a 
sampling of what the FDA’s Of-
fice of Criminal Investigations 
(OCI)4 tackles. OCI is charged 
with the responsibility to keep 
consumers safe and to ensure the 
public’s health, a broad delegation 
that encompasses a wide array of 
duties. In so doing, the FDA must 
balance all the interests at stake– 
the need for safe, legitimate medi-
cation and health care services, 
while at the same time such medi-
Complications of Globalization: FDA Cracks Down on Fraud in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
cation and services must be af-
fordable and readily available for 
everyone in the nation. In light of 
the need for a balance and as the 
examples above show, the FDA 
faces a dilemma since the demand 
for drugs is high and there has 
been a rise in both fraudulent, un-
licensed drug manufacturers and 
sellers, and counterfeit drugs on 
the market. These issues are in 
part the results of the rise in glob-
alization, which largely affects the 
nature of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry.  
 
Black Market Rings and Glob-
alization 
 Black market pharmacy 
rings continue to threaten the na-
tion’s public health. While many 
ring members have been arrested 
for violating the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA),5 a myriad of problems 
persist, and for a variety of rea-
sons. For one, many undocument-
ed immigrants purchase and seek 
treatment from these FDCA viola-
tors who offer reduced services 
and/or medication, out of fear that 
their status will be discovered and 
they will be deported if they seek 
treatment at legitimate, state-
licensed clinics.6 Second, some 
criminals falsely claim to have 
medical backgrounds, and sell 
prescription drugs or counterfeit 
drugs, perhaps even administering 
injections.7 Furthermore, some 
sell prescription drugs that have 
been approved in a foreign coun-
try but have not passed FDA in-
spection in the United States.8  
The issues are numerous 
and the degree of harm grave. 
Drug standards and regulations 
vary from country to country, 
and the FDA is responsible only 
for those marketed and sold in 
the US. The FDA accomplishes 
this task by imposing stringent 
standards for drug approval and 
manufacturing. Additionally, US 
pharmacists and wholesalers 
must be licensed or authorized in 
the states where they operate. 
This type of process has been 
referred to as a closed distribu-
tion system.9 Clearly, this system 
is disrupted when counterfeit 
drugs enter the market and when 
individuals hold themselves out 
as being licensed when they are 
not. 
 Globalization has con-
tributed to the rise and persis-
tence of counterfeit drugs, as the 
pharmaceutical industry’s com-
plex manufacturing, operations, 
and supply sourcing is increas-
ingly being shifted overseas.10 
These are particularly challeng-
ing times, due in large part to 
tremendous breakthroughs in 
science and technology.11 Such 
worldwide explosion of 
knowledge and capabilities af-
fects many fields of research, 
innovation, and industry.12 Cur-
rently, almost forty percent of 
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 American drugs are imported. 
Moreover, nearly 80 percent of 
the active ingredients in the 
drugs on the American market 
come from overseas sources.13 It 
has been acknowledged that,  
“in addition to the growth in 
volume of imports, there 
has been a dramatic in-
crease in the variety and 
complexity of imported 
products. As the variety and 
complexity of imported 
products has increased, the 
supply chain involving a 
web of numerous repackag-
ing facilities and distribu-
tors has correspondingly 
become more intricate and 
mysterious. Like any chain, 
the drug supply chain is on-
ly as strong as its weakest 
link, and the proliferation of 
additional handlers, suppli-
ers and middlemen creates 
new entry points through 
which contaminated, adul-
terated and counterfeit 
products can infiltrate the 
drug supply.”14  
With the rise of globalization 
and the increasing complexity of 
the drug market, it has become 
easier for the very kind of crimi-
nal behavior described earlier to 
increase and persist.  
 
The FDA Criminal Unit and 
Special Agents  
 The special agents of the 
FDA are the team of criminal 
investigators within OCI who pro-
tect the public health from “theft, 
counterfeiting, fraud, tampering, 
and false advertising as spelled 
out in [the federal laws].”15 The 
special agents are equipped with 
specialized knowledge and train-
ing to investigate violations 
throughout the nation. OCI inves-
tigates about 1,200 criminal cases 
each year that result in arrests of 
about 300 criminal suspects; over 
$11 billion in fines and restitu-
tions were made from 1993 
through November 2010 due to 
OCI’s efforts.16 
 Of course and as with any 
other agency, OCI’s resources are 
limited and not every suspected 
case can be investigated. Because 
of this, the FDA continues to de-
velop risk models17 and manage-
ment tools to identify drugs and 
their ingredients that are the most 
at risk of economically motivated 
adulteration. The FDA allocates a 
majority of its resources and ef-
forts to monitor those identified.18  
Commissioner of Food and Drugs 
Margaret Hamburg explained, 
“We combine risk-based ap-
proaches with sound scientific 
evidence to protect the public 
from adulterated drugs and take a 
number of factors into account in 
determining whether a particular 
drug ingredient may be at risk for 
adulteration.”19 The FDA also 
acknowledge that, to a large ex-
tent, their “success or failure in 
this effort will depend on the rela-
tionships we establish and main-
tain with our foreign partners.”20 
Thus, to mitigate the effects of 
globalization the FDA engages in 
joint efforts with other coun-
tries.21 Additionally, the FDA 
launches national campaigns to 
warn consumers of the various 
risks they run, such as when pur-
chasing from online pharmacies, 
or how to keep an eye out for 
counterfeit drugs.22  
Challenges to prosecuting 
FDCA violators: Illegal Inter-
net Pharmacies  
 Under the FDCA,23 each 
importer and each imported drug 
must comply with the extensive 
verification process laid out in the 
Act. However, there are several 
challenges to ensuring and prose-
cuting those who are in violation. 
The Internet poses a huge prob-
lem in prosecuting FDCA viola-
tors. Because drugs can be legiti-
mately sold via online pharma-
cies, there has been a rise in 
many scam websites purporting 
to be licensed when they are, in 
reality, sham websites. Illegal 
online pharmacies prey on pre-
scription drug abusers and the 
most vulnerable members of soci-
ety who must rely on a daily 
medicine regimen.24 These indi-
viduals make up a large portion 
of their consumers.25 The Nation-
al Association of Boards of Phar-
macy (NABP) created the Veri-
fied Internet Pharmacy Practice 
Sites (VIPPS) accreditation pro-
gram in 1999 in order to help 
consumers find safe sources for 
purchasing medicine online, and 
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to avoid purchasing medicine 
through fake online pharmacies.26  
 For example, federal 
search warrants 
were filed and 
investigations en-
tered this past 
summer for the 
illegal importa-
tion of low-cost 
foreign drugs27 




Drugs, who is suspected of operat-
ing as a shipping hub for an online 
pharmacy based in Winnipeg with 
connections to entities in Barba-
dos.28 The NABP reports that there 
are more than 9,000 “rogue sites” 
on the Internet, which are out of 
compliance with U.S. pharmacy 
laws and standards. Undercover 
buys have been taking place in or-
der for these illegitimate sales to 
be uncovered.29 This issue is multi
-faceted, and in order for it to be 
adequately addressed, there is a 
necessity for advocacy and for in-
formation to be actively relayed to 
all those involved and 
“victimized”.  
Current FDA Legislative Action 
  In July of this year, Presi-
dent Obama signed and approved 
the Food and Drug Administration 
Safety and Innovation Act 
(FDASIA), also known as the 
FDA Reform Act of 2012, under 
which several amendments to the 
Continued… 
FDCA were made. These amend-
ments aim to address various is-
sues such as the nation’s current 
drug shortage and to implement 
policies to improve and accelerate 
access to treatments and drugs.30 
The Act also enhances penalties 
for counterfeiting drugs, and Sec-
tion 717 directs the Attorney Gen-
eral to “give increased priority to 
effects to investigate and prose-
cute offenses under the law that 
involve counterfeit drugs.”31 The 
FDASIA adds to the Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction provision of 21 
USC §331 that, “over any viola-
tion of this Act relating to any ar-
ticle regulated under the Act is 
such article was intended for im-
port into the US…”32 Such an ex-
traterritorial federal jurisdiction 
provision enables United States 
law enforcement to hold account-
able those who violate our safety 
law.33 The legislature, for the first 
time in history, provides FDA 
with information about importers 
and enables the FDA to control 
imported pharmaceuticals and de-
vices. It also allows FDA to de-
tain or to destroy counterfeit or 
adulterated drugs, prohibit the en-
try of imported drugs that have 
been delayed or been denied in-
spection by the FDA, and will en-
courage parity in the inspections 
of domestic and foreign drug es-
tablishments.34 
Despite these efforts by 
the federal government to address 
the issues regarding counterfeit 
drugs and illegal internet sales, 
one major recent criticism is 
that Congress hasn’t gotten 
around to passing certain leg-
islation needed in order for  
“FDA’s plan to level the plant 
inspection playing field by vis-
iting foreign plants at least as 
often as it does U.S. facilities 
[to] get off the grounds [as 
soon] as planned.”35 Surely, 
the ability for the FDA to in-
spect foreign plants plays a 
role in its ability to ensure that 
there is no criminal activity 
within the US pharmaceutical 
industry. This is also reflective 
of the role of globalization and 
its effects on the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, mentioned earlier. 
“With an explosion in global 
API [active pharmaceutical 
ingredient] and pharmaceutical 
manufacturing, the FDA has 
been hard-pressed to keep up 
with inspections.”36 Lawmak-
ers have been discussing legis-
lation which would grant the 
FDA ability to better regulate 
and inspect foreign plants and 
drugs processed therein, but 
such provisions were ultimate-
ly left out of the legislation 
that did pass-thus the issue 
will have to wait until after the 
November 6 elections.37 This 
is a pressing issue, since the 
agency currently lacks re-
sources to conduct reviews 
and inspect facilities. There-
fore, millions of dosages of 
drugs come in from overseas 
without any inspection. A ma-
jority of pharmaceutical 
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ingredients are made in foreign 
factories, but the standards in 
these other countries fall below 
those mandated by the U.S.38  
 Another major criticism 
discussed during the Congres-
sional hearings on the FDASIA 
prior to its passage relates back 
to the globalized structure of the 
pharmaceutical supply chain.39 
So much of the pharmaceutical 
supply chain relies on interstate 
commerce, and so federal gov-
ernment must ensure that 
properly licensed entities are 
involved in the pharmaceutical 
supply chain. One speaker point-
ed to the fact that “the way pre-
scription drugs are moved from 
the manufacturer to the consum-
er has changed over the past sev-
eral years,”40 and “we cannot 
realistically expect to have a 
thorough and comprehensive 
national supply chain track-and-
trace system without providing 
for a clear and accurate defini-
tion of third party logistics pro-
viders.”41 Our federal laws must 
reflect this new reality.  
 The rise in and effects of 
globalization has been a com-
mon thread throughout this arti-
cle, and I have hinted at but have 
not explicitly mentioned how 
transparency may effectively 
alleviate some of its negative 
consequences. However, it 
should be clear how the trans-
parency is fundamental. Only if 
the consumers are aware of safe-
ty risks and scams, will they be 
able to make smart and responsi-
ble choices. Further, while there is 
no factual evidence, it can be 
speculated that perhaps the en-
hanced criminal penalties will de-
ter potential violators from acting 
illegally, finding that the risk of 
prosecution outweighs the bene-
fits from engaging in counterfeit 
drug distribution. Improving 
transparency of FDA regulation 
was also one major goal of Con-
gress when passing the FDASIA; 
it was stated during a Congres-
sional hearing on this legislation 
that the bill includes significant 
accountability and reform 
measures designed to hold the 
FDA responsible for its perfor-
mance, and the committee over-
seeing the FDA can ensure that 
the FDA is adequately perform-
ing.42 “A significant improvement 
was made to the FDA’s ability to 
police an ever-growing global 
drug supply chain to improve pa-
tient safety, and these provisions 
will give the FDA critical tools it 
needs to keep our medicine saf-
er.”43  
 Though it is ultimately 
among the FDA’s responsibilities 
to ensure the public health and 
consumer safety, the effects of 
globalization such as the rise in 
sale of fraudulent drugs brings 
rise to the need for all involved to 
step up efforts against illegal drug 
sales,44 including consumers 
themselves. The FDA will contin-
ue its public education cam-
paigns, using several different 
approaches including the FDA 
web site, radio and print public 
service announcements, bro-
chures, newspaper articles, and 
outreach by public affairs special-
ists,45 in order to reach the maxi-
mum amount of consumers and 









GLOBALIZATION HAS CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE RISE AND PERSISTENCE OF 
COUNTERFEIT DRUGS, AS THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY’S 
COMPLEX MANUFACTURING, OPER-
ATIONS, AND SUPPLY SOURCING IS 
INCREASINGLY BEING SHIFTED 
OVERSEAS.  




 Last month, Massachusetts 
passed a new law allowing for 
medical malpractice apology re-
form with a “Disclosure, Apology, 
and Offer” approach, hoping to 
change the way lawsuits evolve 
between the legal and medical 
communities.1 The basic premise 
of medical malpractice apology 
laws is that patients are less likely 
to sue for extreme monetary dam-
ages, or at the very least, more 
willing to come to a meaningful 
settlement conference if their emo-
tional damages have been ad-
dressed by those parties responsi-
ble for the suffering.2 While over 
half of the states have already en-
acted various forms of apology 
laws, this new effort by Massachu-
setts is the most extensive and am-
bitious of its kind making patient 
safety a top priority.  
 The Massachusetts Disclo-
sure, Apology, and Offer approach 
is far-reaching in its goals and the 
medical and legal communities are 
currently working through a series 
of pilot programs to find out which 
measures work most effectively.3 
The goal of the law is to create a 
proactive system that allows doc-
tors to be frank and open with pa-
tients instead of being told by in-
surance companies that the medi-
cal staff is not allowed to contact 
the patients. Under the law, doc-
Medical Malpractice Apology Law: “Don’t Tell Me What  
Happened, Tell Me That You’re Sorry” 
tors are allowed to admit respon-
sibility for patient injuries and 
offer apologetic statements that 
cannot be used as an automatic 
admission of guilt in a court of 
law. In the end, the goal is not to 
avoid medical payments to suffer-
ing patients, but to make the pro-
cess less adversarial, rendering 
the court a last resort for conflict 
resolution.4 Massachusetts legisla-
tors hope to tackle complex issues 
surrounding patient relationships, 
the measures needed to encourage 
doctor disclosure, the tort system, 
and how costs may be reduced 
overall.5 With enactment of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act and its goals of cost con-
tainment in the national medical 
system, the conversation now 
turns to how unnecessary costs 
can be avoided.6 In turn, states are 
looking to reduce costs in every 
possible arena, including litiga-
tion. Apology laws and similar 
legislative efforts are a creative 
way to bridge patient needs with 
those of the medical community 
in a mutually beneficial arrange-
ment while at the same time, navi-
gating the wake of adverse medi-
cal experiences.  
 Apology laws work to 
open the lines of communication 
that a functional doctor-patient 
relationship requires. The Massa-
chusetts law in particular creates a 
six month “cooling off” period 
between patients and medical pro-
fessionals. This period allows 
both sides to come to a better 
understanding of what should 
have happened during the medi-
cal treatment, what did happen, 
whether positive or negative re-
sults, and how to proceed after 
the fact.7 If a patient is angry 
about a hospital stay or the re-
sults after a surgery, these con-
cerns need to be addressed by 
the responsible medical profes-
sional and in a timely fashion. 
During this cooling off period, 
the parties are required to come 
to the negotiation table to ex-
change information about the 
episode and doctors are allowed 
the opportunity to safely offer 
empathetic apologies without the 
threat of admissibility in court.8 
Legislators are hopeful this can 
aid the state in moving toward a 
more efficient process of han-
dling medical malpractice cases. 
 There are several possi-
ble advantages to implementing 
apology laws such as those being 
reviewed and instituted by the 
Massachusetts legislature.  In-
stead of being stalled in court-
house discovery and trial sched-
ules, cases can more rapidly 
move toward meaningful negoti-
ation because both parties have 
committed to the mutual goal of 
resolving the conflict, rather than 
continuing the lawsuit for pur-
poses of anger or revenge.9 Ad-
vanced apology laws create a  
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healthy mix of streamlined dis-
pute resolution for both mone-
tary and emotional suffering. In 
this type of negotiation setting, 
extra medical payments could be 
offered by the physician to miti-
gate damages and patient rela-
tionships could be more effec-
tively mended after these ad-
verse medical experiences.10 In 
moving toward this process, we 
have to get away from a place 
where the legal relationship with 
the medical community dances 
on the edge of mistrust because 
of rising medical costs and qual-
ity of care issues. 
 Disputes are not static, 
rather some scholars argue that 
arguments and disagreements 
are a social construct requiring 
two actors, reacting to and ad-
vancing the situation.11  For two 
parties to constructively work 
through a disagreement and 
reach a point of negotiation, 
both must “perceive, interpret, 
and understand the context of 
the negotiation, the other parties, 
and themselves.”12 Patients who 
feel wronged by their doctors are 
less likely to retain feelings of 
anger and mistrust if a meaning-
ful agreement is reached, ideally 
one where a patient’s emotional 
anger and financial injury have 
both been redressed. Research 
has shown that participants who 
made a favorable evaluation of 
an apology, that is, believed the 
apology and its information 
were adequate, were more likely 
to agree to settle a case than they 
were to reject an offer.13 In order 
to get to an ideal point, apologies 
cannot be simplistic statements of 
sympathy or dry explanations of 
the facts.14 It takes more than a 
simple conversation to repair the 
relationship between a doctor and 
a patient who feels something has 
gone wrong. We have to craft 
medical malpractice apology law 
to encourage the right kind of 
apologies. Massachusetts takes 
one step closer to this ideal in its 
creation use of the Disclosure, 
Apology, and Offer law. 
 When patients feel that 
something has gone wrong, or 
that a doctor has not treated them 
the way they wanted, quick and 
effective action is needed. While 
it is unfair to say that every bad 
result in medicine equates to a 
particular doctor at fault, most 
patients still aspire for open com-
munication and assistance in 
problem resolution.15 Honesty hits 
at an important part of the medi-
cal malpractice process if patients 
feel that facts were distorted or 
that the doctors were not being 
forthcoming. Doctors have so 
long feared the unpredictability of 
the medical malpractice industry 
and the consequences of their pa-
tient interactions in a court of law 
that the culture of practicing pro-
tectionist medicine has developed 
without the opportunity for us to 
stop, reflect, and correct it.16 An 
apology works to chip away at the 
raw anger the patient feels about 
what has happened. Furthermore, 
mere expressions of sympathy do 
not achieve the same results as a 
full acceptance of responsibility 
and an expression of willingness 
to work together to rectify the sit-
uation.17 In offering up full and 
complete apologies rather than 
statements of sympathy which 
only get halfway to understand-
ing, doctors bring themselves 
down to the laymen’s level where 
they can reach the level of hu-
mans who share the same goals. 
In the end, we can hope to avert 
“unwarranted malpractice claims 
filed in anger instead of true 
wrongdoing.”18 In the end, the 
medical malpractice apology laws 
are efforts to give angry patients 
by giving them a sense of closure, 
as well as reduce the amount of 
extra punitive damages.  
  A harsh example of apol-
ogies gone wrong, outrage was 
recently re-sparked in the case of 
Thalidomide manufacturer Grü-
nenthal when they issued an apol-
ogy on August 31, 2012 express-
ing remorse for the negligent sale 
of the dangerous drug in the 
1950s.19 The drug, used by preg-
nant women to relieve morning 
sickness, caused thousands of ba-
bies to be born with shortened or 
missing limbs. The drug was 
pulled from the market in 1961, 
but no formal apology had ever 
issued from the company.20 The 
recently offered apology came so 
long after the initial injuries, 
many decades after thousands of 
families were ignored in their suf-
fering, that Grünenthal’s CEO 
Harald Stock had to preface his 
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statement with an apology for not 
apologizing.21 As a result, the 
goodwill effect that an apologizer 
hopes the apology will have is 
misplaced because the victims in-
stead become focused on the ne-
glect they previously faced.22 
While it would have been inappro-
priate for the company to never 
offer a statement of remorse for 
the mistakes it made, one must 
question the severe delay of this 
particular Thalidomide apology. 
Effective apologies provide reme-
diation to the victims, opening up 
a line of communication that as-
sures the public that nothing as 
horrific will happen in the future.23 
If Grünenthal had apologized ear-
lier, perhaps its victims would 
have been quicker to forgive and 
move on with closure in their 
lives. Instead, the tragedy leaves 
one with even worse tainted mem-
ories. 
 As an analogy for the city 
dweller, the effect of proper apolo-
gies and the laws that allow for 
them explain why commuters were 
so pleased last November when 
the NYC subway finally changed 
their “This train is late” message.24 
Previously, when someone was 
delayed to work or school, the tin-
ny, mechanical voice overhead 
acknowledged that the train was 
moving slow, but also added in a 
reminder to, “Please be patient.” 
Continued…  
Now we commute in a world 
where the NYC subway not only 
recognizes the inconvenience 
caused but also adds in a remorse-
ful “We apologize for the de-
lay.”25  People want to be told that 
the wrongdoers are sorry and that 
they are doing everything possible 
to fix it. The sting of conflict 
comes most painfully when an 
apology feels insufficient, insin-
cere, or is offered far too late to 
do any reparations. People do not 
want the MTA telling them to be 
patient. Similarly, we do not want 
our doctors to tell us that some-
thing went wrong; there will be an 
innate sense that something went 
wrong when a medical bill has 
extended far beyond the expected 
cost, or an anticipated recovery 
time period is botched by further 
complication. Instead, we want 
doctors to stop, accept responsi-
bility for whatever part they may 
have played in the error, and then 
express remorse and empathy for 
what is happening. Perhaps this is 
what our nation’s doctors want as 
well - to be able to relate to pa-
tients as real people without the 
constant threat of lawsuit always 
lurking behind them. 
In the end, the new law in 
Massachusetts and other efforts 
across the country take great steps 
toward opening up the conversa-
tion between aggrieved patients 
and doctors nervous about the le-
gal consequences of honesty. The 
cloud of litigation looms over all 
parties, but if the legal community 
is able to work with both doctor 
and patient, perhaps everyone 
will be able to be more honest 
with themselves about what 
needs to be achieved. Patients 
have a need to feel like people 
after they have adverse medical 
experiences and they want their 
doctors to treat them like peers, 
perhaps paying necessary bills 
incurred out of the controversy. 
Doctors have a need for the lee-
way to make healthcare deci-
sions without fear that a lawsuit 
will necessarily result and if 
something adverse occurs, doc-
tors need to be able to apologize 
on a basic human level without it 
being an automatic admission of 
fault. Eventually, everybody’s 
needs come down to emotional 
human interaction. This is what 
separates the bad apologies from 
the good apologies, and this is 
where we need medical malprac-
tice laws to head. 
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On March 23, 2010, President 
Barack Obama signed into law 
the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act (hereinafter 
“PPACA”).1  Congress intended 
the PPACA to reduce the cost of 
health care to the consumer and 
to make health insurance afford-
able to all Americans.2 Prior to 
the PPACA, fifty million indi-
viduals under age sixty five 
were uninsured.3 Most of these 
uninsured were part of a family 
with at least one full-time work-
er.4 Often the reason for being 
uninsured laid not with availa-
bility, but with affordability.  
This Article purports to 
conduct a simple analysis of the 
actual affordability of health 
care under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Health Care Act. 
There is an unfortunate gap be-
tween the income level where 
many of the new cost reducing 
measures end and higher income 
levels where households do not 
feel the cost as sharply. Those in 
this gap who experience signifi-
cant medical costs beyond their 
premiums risk medical bank-
ruptcy due to extensive and ex-
pensive out-of-pocket costs.  
 
 
What makes health care afford-
able 
 Any determination of what 
constitutes affordable health care 
will, at least to some extent, be 
arbitrary because individual 
households must determine what 
level of coverage they believe 
best suits their needs. For exam-
ple, the PPACA health plans in 
insurance exchanges fall under 
several categories, each of which 
carries its own premium price 
based on actuarial statistics.5 Ad-
ditionally, households have a vari-
ety of health needs with varying 
costs. Combining these two reali-
ties results in a spectrum of actual 
household expenditure on health. 
 There are, however, poten-
tial objective metrics of afforda-
ble care. The cost sharing subsi-
dies and premium tax credits 
available to those between 300% 
and 400% of the federal poverty 
level set the maximum percentage 
of household income that a health 
policy will cost at 9.5%.6  Ostensi-
bly, this means that the federal 
government believes that a policy 
costing more than 9.5% of one’s 
income becomes unaffordable. 
However, ten percent may be a 
better number to use as a baseline. 
It is slightly higher than the 9.5% 
and much evidence supports ten 
percent of household income as 
the line above which health care 
becomes unaffordable.7 The same 
research indicates that to fully un-
derstand and determine the af-
fordability of health insurance 
and health care one must take a 
holistic approach and take into 
account all other necessary ex-
penses. 
 One of the main approach-
es to defining affordability8 con-
siders other (non-health related) 
necessary budgetary requirements 
on families.9 Necessary budgetary 
requirements include childcare, 
food, housing, taxes and transpor-
tation.10 Karen Davenport propos-
es two approaches to affordabil-
ity.11  The first considers house-
hold budgets, measuring the dol-
lar amount each household spends 
on necessities and then treating 
health care expenditures as an 
extra expense.12 This approach 
considers any remaining money 
after the purchase of necessities 
in the household budget to be 
available for the purchase of 
health care.13 Her second ap-
proach considers the share of in-
come Americans can actually 
spend on health care, measuring 
premiums and out-of-pocket ex-
penses as a share of income.14 
Ms. Davenport postulates that 
health insurance is unaffordable if 
over ten percent of income must 
be spent.15 Her approach is very 
similar to the method employed 
here: a determination of afforda-
bility using both objective and 
subjective metrics.  
 The type of healthcare 
plan analyzed in order to deter-
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mine the affordability of the 
PPACA will be one obtained on an 
insurance exchange created 
through the Act.16 The analysis 
will be narrowed by concentrating 
on households in extremely expen-
sive medical situations. These 
families tend to be most at risk and 
are the people the law should work 
hardest to protect. In the most se-
vere cases, the end result of seri-
ous medical costs can be bankrupt-
cy.17 Since 2000, an estimated five 
million families have filed for 
bankruptcy in the aftermath of se-
rious medical problems.18 The 
families filing for bankruptcy do 
not necessarily belong to lower 
income brackets but indeed fall 
under an array of income levels.19 
This problem should be one that 
the PPACA helps to alleviate (if 
not eliminate) by allowing fami-
lies, at any income level, the abil-
ity to deal with serious medical 
problems affordably.20 
Does the Affordable Health Care 
Act actually make health care 
affordable? 
 The first step in the analy-
sis will be to find, generally, at 
what income level health care 
costs for the most expensive con-
sumers become unaffordable. In 
order to hone in on the specific 
case where this may occur, it is 
helpful to illustrate several scenar-
ios generally and go in depth re-
garding the scenario of interest. 
Health insurance premiums are 
calculated in 2014 dollars and as-
suming an average insurance price 
Continued…  
market.21 Premium calculations 
are consistent with estimates of 
premiums under the PPACA pre-
pared by the Congressional Budg-
et Office.22 However, it is im-
portant to note that all values are 
estimates and subject to change. 
 Affordable care begins 
with an analysis at the bottom lev-
el of household income, those 
making less than 133% of the 
poverty level. So long as the indi-
vidual’s income does not exceed 
133% of the federal poverty level 
that individual may be covered 
through Medicaid.23 The details of 
Medicaid exceed the scope of this 
article. However, coverage 
through Medicaid may be ac-
quired for very low, if not effec-
tively zero cost.24 The efficacy of 
Medicaid lies beyond the focus of 
this article, and therefore it may 
be assumed that households 
whose income falls below 133% 
of the federal poverty level may 
obtain affordable health coverage. 
 The next scenario involves 
a single forty-year-old adult mak-
ing 134% of the federal poverty 
level. Such an individual would 
have $15,417 dollars in annual 
income.25 This person’s unsubsi-
dized health insurance premium 
costs $4,500 dollars.26 However, 
the maximum percent of income 
the person must pay if eligible for 
a subsidy is 3.06%.27 Therefore, 
the insured would only actually 
pay $472 dollars in premium, re-
ceiving a $4,028 dollar tax cred-
it.28 Additionally, the maximum 
out of pocket (hereinafter 
“OOP”) costs will be $2,083 dol-
lars (which is equivalent to two-
thirds of maximum OOP cost for 
any health insurance consum-
er).29 In the worst-case scenario, 
assuming the most catastrophic 
medical costs, this person will 
have to pay $2,555 dollars in the 
year for medical expenses. Alt-
hough the premium only costs 
this individual 3.06% of his an-
nual income, should this person 
require a lot of health care, and 
incur the maximum cost, his or 
her health care costs balloon to 
16.6% of annual income.30 Such 
cost at high levels of medical 
expense demonstrates the risk of 
medical bankruptcy, especially if 
these costs are maintained for 
several years.31 
 For a family of four mak-
ing 134% of the federal poverty 
level, household income increas-
es to $31,389 dollars.32 In this 
situation the pattern previously 
demonstrated continues. The 
premium price, through the 
PPACA’s subsidy provisions, 
may be completely reasonable at 
3.06% of annual income.33 How-
ever, should the family experi-
ence serious medical issues and 
be forced to pay the maximum 
amount of costs under the 
PPACA rubric this family’s 
health care costs balloon to 
16.3% of annual income.34  
      Continued on page 32 
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A single 40-year-old adult when 
making 250% of the federal 
poverty level has an annual in-
come of $28,763 dollars.35 Con-
fronted with the most expensive 
possible medical year, the total 
medical costs of this individual 
equal $5,440 dollars under 
PPACA.36 In such a situation, 
18.9% of the individual’s in-
come must be spent on health 
care. This increase can be large-
ly contributed to the lesser OOP 
cost protection.37 
 Like in the previous sce-
narios illustrating costs at 134% 
of the federal poverty level, the 
family of four’s relative health 
cost, when making 250% of the 
federal poverty level, comes to 
similar values as the single adult 
at 250% of the federal poverty 
level. Assuming the worst medi-
cal financial situation, this fami-
ly’s health expenses cap at 
$10,964.38 Should the family 
incur these maximum costs, 
health care will constitute 18.7% 
of their annual income.39 
 A single 40-year-old 
adult making 403% over the fed-
eral poverty level makes 
$46,466 dollars of income.40 In 
the worst-case scenario, the indi-
vidual will be responsible for 
$10,750 dollars.41 Therefore, 
should this person require the 
most expensive health care 
needs it will cost 23.1% of annu-
al income.42 
 A family of four making 
403% of the federal poverty level 
makes $94,402 dollars of in-
come.43 Should this family incur 
the most expensive medical cir-
cumstances, this family will pay 
$24,630 dollars.44 Should the 
family be required to pay this 
maximum amount due to expen-
sive medical care, twenty six per-
cent of their annual income will 
go towards medical expenses.45 
 Medical costs will, of 
course, be most expensive at in-
comes just over the end of 
PPACA subsidization.46 As in-
come increases, the percentage of 
income spent on health care de-
creases. At some point health 
costs revert back to subsidized 
levels. For a family of four mak-
ing 515% over the federal poverty 
level, their income reaches 
$120,638 dollars.47 Their health 
insurance premium will be 
$12,130 dollars, and they are not 
eligible for any subsidies and so 
will pay the full amount.48 This 
premium price constitutes 10.05% 
of the family’s income. The maxi-
mum OOP costs the family will 
be responsible for is $12,500.49 
Assuming the family must cover 
the maximum amount, they will 
incur $24,630 of medical expens-
es, which constitutes 20.4% of 
their annual income. 
A. The Gap in Affordability 
 These scenarios illustrate 
two of the gaps in affordable 
health coverage. For a single 
adult, the PPACA seems to cover 
all incomes (assuming the insured 
remains healthy). The single adult 
making just over where the 
PPACA subsidies stop kicking in 
only has their premium costs in-
crease by a marginal 0.21%.50 
The first gap in affordable cover-
age lies under middle class fami-
lies with income levels between 
approximately $94,400 and 
$120,600 dollars. When families 
breach the barrier of federal sub-
sidies, the baseline percent in-
come spent on health coverage 
jumps to over 12.85%.51 Howev-
er, once a family’s income in-
creases to around 515% of the 
federal poverty level the premium 
only costs 10.05%. As discussed 
above, ten percent appears to be a 
reasonable cost for a health insur-
ance premium.52 So it would 
seem then that, objectively, the 
PPACA does not cover a signifi-
cant amount of households within 
the middle class of income level 
and therefore leaves this group to 
pay an unreasonably high premi-
um price in relation to their in-
come.53 The law, despite trying to 
treat everybody equally54, contin-
ues in practice to maintain, albeit 
unintentionally, a certain discrim-
ination in terms of affordability.  
 Another dichotomy also 
presents a troubling and serious 
problem, illustrating the second 
gap in affordable health coverage. 
The difference between a premi-
um costing ten or thirteen percent 
of a household’s income, while 
not achieving the PPACA goal of 
affordable health coverage for all, 
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likely does not pose too serious a 
financial risk.55 However, the evi-
dence presented suggests that the 
PPACA envisions a system of af-
fordable care for the healthy, while 
condoning medical bankruptcy for 
the seriously and chronically ill. 
The family making 134% of the 
poverty level must only pay 3.06% 
of their annual income on the in-
surance premium.56 However, con-
fronted with an extremely expen-
sive medical situation, even with 
the most protection in place, the 
PPACA forces the insured to con-
tribute 16.3% of their annual in-
come to health expenses.57 This 
portends the second gap where the 
healthy may obtain affordable 
health insurance while the chroni-
cally sick must still endure ex-
tremely high costs. For a family of 
four making 134% of the poverty 
level, this means that they must 
pay $5,127 dollars from their in-
come of $31,389 dollars, leaving 
$26,262 dollars of income for the 
year. 
 Out of this remaining 
$26,262 dollars the average family 
then must spend in necessities 
about $27,950 dollars (in food, 
housing, apparel, transportation, 
and education).58 Although this is 
a rough estimate, large health costs 
clearly result in at least no savings 
without taking into account any 
amenities. At worst, a family with 
the maximum health costs allowed 
by the PPACA actually incurs debt 
every year by simply purchasing 
the necessities of life. 
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B. The PPACA continues to al-
low medical bankruptcy  
 When the PPACA ceases 
to provide price protections, the 
situation becomes much more dire 
for the insured on the wrong side 
of the line. For a family of four 
making 403% of the federal pov-
erty level facing the most expen-
sive health coverage costs allowa-
ble by the PPACA, twenty-six 
percent or $24,630 dollars will be 
spent.59 From an after tax income 
of about $91,218 dollars, this 
leaves $66,588.60 Out of this re-
maining money, other necessities 
must be paid.61 Data exists regard-
ing nearly all consumer expendi-
tures. However, the expenditures 
that “count” in this analysis must 
be “necessary.”62 Necessary ex-
penditures include childcare, 
food, housing, taxes, transporta-
tion, and certain miscellaneous 
expenses (calculated as 10% of 
other costs).63 These expenses to-
tal $42,557 dollars.64 Combined 
with health care costs of $24,630 
dollars, this family of four will 
pay $67,187 dollars to simply sur-
vive. The family will retain 
$24,031 dollars, or 25.5%, of their 
annual income to be used for “non
-essentials.”65 Of the $67,187 dol-
lars of necessary expenses, 35.8% 
derive from health care and 
18.6% from OOP costs.66 All of 
these costs must be taken into ac-
count because they are necessi-
ties. Housing and food must be 
considered in any discussion of 
affordability. These necessities 
are not itemized by the family, 
and so neither should they be 
itemized in any discussion of the 
goals of a law directed towards 
making life essentials affordable. 
 This one scenario illus-
trates clearly where the PPACA 
fails to deliver: to those most at 
risk and most vulnerable. A sig-
nificant portion of families filing 
for bankruptcy do so because of 
medical reasons.67  This is the 
class that the PPACA purports to 
protect the most. Instead, the 
PPACA envisions a system of 
health insurance that assumes 
good health, and leaves those 
with the most serious health 
problems out to dry. Much feder-
al legislation has been designed 
to provide a social safety net.68 
The PPACA, however, is de-
signed less as a safety net and 
more as simple insurance regula-
tion to prevent price gouging.69 
However, if, as Title I of 
PPACA claims, the Act envi-
sions “affordable health care for 
all Americans” then medical 
bankruptcy should cease to exist 
following the implementation of 
all PPACA provisions.70 As 
demonstrated above, unfortu-
nately families outside the struc-
ture of price modifications shall 
continue to suffer.71 
 Thus, there is the gaping 
hole in the PPACA. A typical 
family of four making an aver-
age income must pay a quarter of 
their income towards health care 
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should one member get severely 
ill.72 When taking other neces-
sary expenses into account, as 
the literature suggests must be 
done to truly measure affordabil-
ity, the family retains merely 
one quarter of their annual in-
come. To pose a purely econom-
ic argument, with such little dis-
posable income their contribu-
tion to consumption in areas oth-
er than health care diminishes 
greatly and therefore harms all 
other sectors of the economy.73 
Even if this family remains per-
fectly healthy (and so must only 
pay a premium for the health 
insurance) their premium ex-
ceeds virtually all determina-
tions of affordability.74 
 The true problem with 
the gap in affordability, especial-
ly with the nature of the gap be-
ing predominately an extreme 
exposure to out of pocket costs, 
lies with medical bankruptcy as 
discussed above. A study con-
ducted and published in the 
American Journal of Medicine 
analyzed the effect that the Mas-
sachusetts health care reform 
laws, enacted between 2006 and 
2007, had on medical bankrupt-
cy in the state.75 The study was 
performed in order to shed light 
on how national health reform, 
in the form of the PPACA, 
would affect nationwide medical 
bankruptcy. The analogy is pos-
sible because the PPACA close-
ly resembles the Massachusetts 
reforms and in many ways the 
Massachusetts reforms were a 
precursor to the PPACA.76  The 
study concluded that, while the 
number of uninsured decreased, 
the Massachusetts health reform 
laws did not decrease the amount 
of medical bankruptcies.77 The 
study further concluded that the 
Massachusetts reforms left many 
of the insured with inadequate 
financial protection.78 
This risk of medical bank-
ruptcy may affect even those indi-
viduals and families able to scrape 
by while incurring heavy medical 
costs. By investing so much in-
come into health care, the family 
loses its capability of absorbing 
any shock to either their expendi-
tures or their income. If suddenly 
one of the two working heads of 
the household loses their job, the 
ability to sustain high medical 
costs may, with little warning, put 
that family on the path to medical 
bankruptcy. In the same vein, a 
sudden sharp expenditure, such as 
the need to purchase a new car 
due to an accident, may also put a 
family with no anti-shock capa-
bility over the edge. In either case 
the PPACA places families in a 
situation with no anti-shock abil-
ity and thus one bad life event 
away from possible medical 
bankruptcy. 
Combining the gap in the 
PPACA’s cost sharing provisions 
and the study above, the 
PPACA’s potential failure to pro-
tect those most vulnerable to fi-
nancial disaster due to medical 
costs jumps out. Medical bank-
ruptcy will still be a very real 
possibility for those in the gap, 
such as the family of four making 
403% of the poverty level de-
scribed above. Couple these cur-
rently existing gaps in affordabil-
ity with the rate of medical cost 
inflation and the PPACA allows, 
albeit unintentionally, families 
that endure high medical costs to 
experience the kind of economic 
pressure that the PPACA should 
be eliminating.  
Conclusion 
 The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act supposedly 
provides affordable health care to 
all Americans. For much of the 
citizenry of the United States, the 
system created by the PPACA 
will likely help alleviate some of 
the burdens of acquiring health 
insurance and provide those left 
out of the traditional employer-
provided health insurance model 
with access to health insurance at 
a reasonable price and thus allow 
them to receive health care af-
fordably. 
THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT SUPPOS-
EDLY PROVIDES AFFORDABLE 
HEALTH CARE TO ALL AMERI-
CANS. FOR MUCH OF THE CITI-
ZENRY OF THE UNITED STATES, 
THE SYSTEM CREATED BY THE 
PPACA WILL LIKELY HELP ALLEVI-
ATE SOME OF THE BURDENS OF 
ACQUIRING HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE…UNFORTUNATELY, THERE 
ARE SIGNIFICANT HOLES IN THE 
RELATIVELY NEW LAW. 
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Unfortunately, there are 
significant holes in the relatively 
new law. Generally, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Health 
Care Act places a significantly 
larger burden on families making 
between 400% and 500% of the 
federal poverty level (squarely 
middle class income levels). Far 
more serious, however, remains 
the narrow case of a family of 
modest income who unfortunately 
experience serious medical costs 
resulting in the maximum amount 
of health care expenses the 
PPACA allows the consumer to 
bare. Here, the PPACA fails to 
alleviate one of the largest causes 
of bankruptcy in the United States.  
This article is not a total 
condemnation. Rather, the PPACA 
simply contains some holes that 
(much like the infamous Medicare 
doughnut hole) leave a few vulner-
able people out to dry. If the goal 
of the PPACA and the Federal 
Government is to ensure all citi-
zens equal and affordable health 
care coverage, then this problem 
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